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ADDRESSING EX-FELON
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LEGISLATION VS.
LITIGATION
Martine J. Price*
INTRODUCTION
More than one million convicted ex-felons who have
completed their sentences are permanently prohibited from voting
in the United States.1 Felony disenfranchisement laws have
existed since the colonial age and increased in importance and
effect in the post-Civil War era.2 This practice effectively and
disproportionately prohibited many African Americans from
participating in the electoral process, and it continues to have the
same effect today.3 As a result, many affected individuals as well
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2003; B.A., The George Washington
University, 1999. The author would like to thank the staff of the Journal of
Law and Policy for their hard work. She also wishes to thank Dad, Jeremy,
Grandma, Grandpa and especially Mom for their continuing love and support
through all things academic and otherwise. Special thanks to Melissa for her
cherished friendship and Mike for all his love.
1
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2001) [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT]. THE
SENTENCING PROJECT estimates, “1.4 million disenfranchised persons are exoffenders who have completed their sentences.” Id.
2
Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under
the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 538 (1993). Some
Southern states altered the criminal disenfranchisement laws so that they
would have a greater impact on black voters. Id. These states included
Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia. Id. at 541.
3
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1. According to The
Sentencing Project, thirteen percent of black men in the U.S. are
disenfranchised. Id.
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as public interest organizations have attempted to modify felony
disenfranchisement laws to ameliorate the distinction created by
the impact of the laws on minority groups.4
Disenfranchisement laws began in the United States as an
outgrowth of the English practice of imposing collateral civil
consequences to felony convictions.5 Traditionally, this practice
was justified by the belief that convicted felons were more
susceptible to voter corruption and fraud.6 Disenfranchisement
4

JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998). Groups such as
The Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch frequently monitor
legislative and judicial activity with regard to disenfranchisement and conduct
research that may be used in lawsuits brought by ex-felons. Id. In 2000, The
Sentencing Project reported that legislators in Alabama, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Connecticut have proposed legislation lessening
restrictions on ex-felons’ voting rights. PATRICIA ALLARD & MARC MAUER,
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REGAINING THE VOTE: AN ASSESSMENT OF
ACTIVITY RELATING TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 4-9 (2000).
Additionally, lawsuits were filed in the past several years in states such as
New Hampshire, Washington and Pennsylvania in which challenges to the
existing disenfranchisement statutes have been made. Id.; see also infra Part
I.C (discussing disenfranchisement litigation occurring in state courts).
5
FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2-3. The medieval English
government would pass bills of attainder to restrict convicted felons’ rights by
subjecting their property to forfeiture, prohibiting them from inheriting or
bequeathing property and forbidding them from bringing suit in the court
system. Id.
6
See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1884). Courts traditionally
argued that denying the right to vote to convicted ex-felons preserved the
“purity of the ballot box” by protecting the foundation of democracy from exfelons who are unfit to vote. Id. at 585. In Kronlund v. Honstein, the court
stated that the state’s interest in preserving the electoral process justifies the
exclusion of those whose “behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s
aims.” 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Courts rationalized that
permitting ex-felons to vote could possibly disrupt the true intentions of
upstanding citizens. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 15. A California
Supreme court decision reflects this.
The fact that such person committed a crime is evidence that he was
morally “corrupt” at the time he did so; if still morally corrupt when
given the opportunity to vote in an election, he might defile “the
purity of the ballot box” by selling or bartering his vote or otherwise
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also served to protect the sanctity of the voting system and ensure
that convicts could not influence the lawmaking process.7 After
the Civil War, Southern legislatures attempted to limit the
number of eligible black voters by altering felony
disenfranchisement laws to include crimes that leaders believed
were committed more frequently by blacks.8 Mississippi provided
an ideal example for other Southern legislatures in 1890 when it
narrowed the disenfranchisement statute’s application to “black”
crimes such as bribery, burglary, theft and arson.9
Today, felony disenfranchisement continues in varying forms
throughout the United States.10 While two states allow ex-felons
engaging in election fraud; and such activity might affect the outcome
of the election and thus frustrate the freely expressed will of the
remainder of the voters.
Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966); see also FELLNER & MAUER,
supra note 4, at 15; Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: Citizenship,
Criminality, and ‘The Purity of the Ballot Box,’ 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300,
1308 (1989) [hereinafter Citizenship]; Special Project, The Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1173 (1970).
7
FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 15. By disenfranchising ex-felons,
their influence on the political process is eliminated, ensuring that elections
were decided exclusively by “responsible” citizens. Id.; see also Citizenship,
supra note 6, at 1309.
8
Shapiro, supra note 2.
9
Id. at 538 n.20. The relevant portion of the Mississippi Constitution
stated “[e]very male inhabitant of the state . . . who has never been convicted
of bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false
pretenses, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy . . . is declared to be a qualified
elector.” MISS. CONST. art. VII § 241 (1890). See also Ratliff v. Beale, 20
So. 865, 867 (Miss. 1896) (stating that the amended Mississippi Constitution
contained an increased number of restrictions on the franchise).
10
Nicholas Thompson, Locking Up the Vote; Former Prisoners Barred
From Voting Under Florida Law, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 17.
Thompson suggests that contemporary politicians continue to keep
disenfranchisement statutes in place because without such laws they never
would have been elected. Id. Thompson cites a sociological study that asserts
that politicians such as John Warner, Mitch McConnell, Connie Mack, Phil
Gramm and Craig Thomas may never have been elected if the felony
disenfranchisement statutes in their respective states did not exist at the time of
their elections. Id. Such data indicates that many politicians are unwilling to
do anything to substantially alter the disenfranchisement statutes, fearing the
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to vote while in prison,11 others permit ex-felons to vote only
after completing parole.12 Twelve states permanently
loss of their own power. Id. Disenfranchisement constitutional provisions and
statutes enacted several decades ago with the purpose of discrimination,
therefore, continue to exist. Id. Virginia’s 1901 convention, for example,
expanded the disenfranchisement laws in order to eliminate “every Negro
voter who can be gotten rid of legally, without materially impairing the
numerical strength of the white electorate,” id.; see also VA. CONST. art. II, §
23 (1902). Alabama’s 1901 constitution was designed to “ensure white
supremacy.” ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901). Florida’s 1868 constitution
included a disenfranchisement provision that was contested by African
Americans and radical Republicans. FLA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 2, 4 (1868);
see Thompson, supra. Furthermore, case law indicates that many states
continue to justify disenfranchisement based on the beliefs of social contract
theorist John Locke. See, e.g., Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1995).
The social contract theory centers upon the idea that “morality is founded
solely on uniform social agreements that serve the best interests of those who
make the agreement.” James Fieser & Bradley Dowden, eds., Internet
Encyclopedia
of
Philosophy,
Social
Contract,
at
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/soc-cont.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
Expanding on this theory, Locke proposed that a government derives its
authority from the consent of its citizens. See Garth Kemerling, Locke: Social
Order, at http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4n.htm#gov (last visited Oct.
17, 2002). This relationship creates a contract that imposes obligations on both
the political entity and its citizenry. Id. While the contract allows citizens to
overthrow their government when it fails to meet the needs of society, it also
authorizes society to take away privileges such as voting when a citizen has
“abandoned the right to participate” by breaking the social contract. Baker, 58
F.3d at 821 (indicating that the state’s articulated justification for
disenfranchisement was based on the social contract theory set out in Green v.
Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967)). A social contract is made
between an individual and society when an individual enters society,
authorizing the legislature to make laws to protect his own well being. Green,
380 F.2d at 451. See also Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312
(E.D. Wash. 1997) (relying on Green as support for the state’s position that
disenfranchisement is justified); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th
Cir. 1986) (relying on Green).
11
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1. These states are Maine
and Vermont. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 21, § 111 (2001) (listing
the general qualifications in order to vote); ME. STAT. ANN. 21, § 115 (2001)
(listing the restrictions on voter eligibility); VT. STAT. ANN. 17, § 2121
(2002) (listing criteria for voter registration).
12
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also ALASKA
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disenfranchise at least some ex-felons, even after sentence and
parole completion.13 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia
disenfranchise ex-felons only while they are in prison.14 While
pardoning procedures exist in some states to restore voting
STAT. § 15.05.030 (Michie 2002); ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Michie 2002);
CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11 (2001); CAL. STAT. § 14240 (West 2001); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 1-2-606(1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a) (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1001.02(7) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216(b) (2002);
MINN. STAT. § 201.014 (2001); MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (2001); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 32-313 (2002); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:4-1 (2002); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-13-1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 2002);
N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101 (2002); R.I.
CONST. art. II, § 1 (2002); S.C. CONST. art. III, § 7 (2001); TEX. ELEC.
CODE ANN. § 11.002 (Vernon 2002); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (2002); WIS.
STAT. § 6.03 (2001). Delaware imposes a five-year waiting period after
completion of sentence and parole before voting rights may be restored. THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit 15, §
1701 (2001).
13
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3. Alabama, Florida,
Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia and Wyoming permanently
disenfranchise all ex-felons. See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (2002); ALA.
CONST. amend. 579 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 97.041(2)(b) (2001); IOWA CODE
§ 48A.6 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.0452(2)(b) (Banks-Baldwin
2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-19 (2001); NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (2002);
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-101, 418 (2002);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-102 (Michie 2002). Arizona and Maryland
permanently disenfranchise felons after conviction of a second felony. See
ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2(c) (2002); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3-102 (2002).
Tennessee and Washington permanently disenfranchise felons convicted before
1986 and 1984, respectively. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1981);
WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (2002).
14
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-1001.02(7) (2002); HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2 (2002); IDAHO CONST.
art. VI, § 3 (2002); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 37-13-4 (West 2002); KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:102 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. § 1 (2002); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 168.492a (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111(2) (2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 607-A:2, 654:5 (1986); N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (2002);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 161-04-04 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01
(West 2002); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (2001); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301
(2002); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20 A-2-101
(2002).
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rights,15 they are nonetheless difficult to obtain.16
The disproportionate impact on African Americans and other
minorities of many of these state statutes is undeniable.17 African15

Restore Voting Rights After Prison Time, ATL. CONST., June 4, 2001,
at A10, available at 2001 WL 3676390. These include Virginia, Florida,
Kentucky and North Carolina. Id.
16
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 10. In Virginia, a felon must wait
five years after completion of sentence and parole and have paid all fines and
court fees. Id. If those conditions are satisfied, the felon must request a packet
detailing the requirements from the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth’s
Office and then can apply to the Governor for restoration of the right to vote.
Id. The Governor has final authority over whether the felon’s voting rights are
restored. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12. Only about one hundred people complete
the process each year. Frank Green, Panel to Study Ex-felons’ Rights; Va.
Restoration Process Difficult, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 20, 2001, at
B1, available at 2001 WL 5326577. In Florida, a felon must obtain executive
clemency in order to restore his voting rights. ALLARD & MAUER, supra note
4, at 6. The Florida Parole Commission determines whether a felon is eligible
for restoration, and refers a candidate to the Executive Board of Clemency. Id.
If no members of the Clemency Board object, the Clemency Coordinator may
restore the felon’s civil rights. Id. Recently, this process has been streamlined
for some nonviolent, habitual offender ex-felons who no longer must attend a
Clemency Board hearing. Julie Hauserman, Cabinet Eases Rules for Restoring
Ex-felons’ Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 4B (stating that
nonviolent offenses include drug-related crimes). New rules enacted by the
Florida Cabinet also increase the maximum amount of a felon’s outstanding
court fines from two hundred and fifty dollars to one thousand dollars. Scott
Hiaasen, Cabinet Expands Clemency Eligibility, PALM BEACH POST, June 15,
2001, at 7B, available at 2001 WL 21884875.
17
Andrew Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 1997,
at 60, available at 1997 WL 21293207. Because blacks and other minorities
such as Latinos are disproportionately represented within the criminal justice
system, minority ex-felons make up a disproportionate share of the
disenfranchised convicts within the United States. Id. For example, the New
York Division of Criminal Justice Services issued a report in 1995 stating that
black defendants were more likely to receive prison sentences than white
defendants who had been convicted of similar crimes. Id. In several states,
blacks comprise a larger portion of the prison population than whites even
though blacks represent a smaller portion of the state’s total population. Alice
E. Harvey, Ex-felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black Vote:
The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1151-52 (1994). For
example, as of 1990, 0.9% of Alabama’s black population is incarcerated
while 0.2% of whites are imprisoned. Id. In Delaware, 2% of the black
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American men account for an estimated thirty-six percent of all
disenfranchised ex-felons.18 As a result, these statutes restrict the
voting rights of thirteen percent of all adult African-American
males.19 Furthermore, the impact is more extreme in certain
individual states. For example, in both Alabama and Florida,
thirty-one percent of all black men are permanently
disenfranchised.20 In Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia
and Wyoming, one in four black men is permanently
disenfranchised.21 In Delaware, one in five black men are
permanently disenfranchised.22 These statistics indicate that the
current felony disenfranchisement laws have a significantly
higher effect on minorities than on other groups within the
country.
Many of these statutes have been challenged in the twentieth
century through the court system, as well as by state and federal
legislatures, and each of these methods has had varying degrees
of success.23 This note explains the approaches taken through
litigation and legislation in both federal and state arenas. The
strengths and weaknesses of each approach are evaluated, and
this note ultimately concludes that state legislation has the most
potential for success. Part I provides an overview of the litigation
strategies employed to attack disenfranchisement laws. This
includes a discussion of frequently utilized arguments involving
the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution,24
the Voting Rights Act25 and state constitutional litigation. Part II
population is imprisoned as compared to only 0.2% of the white population.
Id. Similar statistics exist for other states, including Florida, Maryland,
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. See also Special Project, The
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV 5 (1970)
(evaluating the impact of felony disenfranchisement on minority populations).
18
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 1.
19
FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
See infra Part I (discussing judicial decisions); see infra Part II
(discussing legislation).
24
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
25
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001).
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analyzes attempts by federal and state legislatures to address this
issue, including a federal congressional bill proposal.26 It also
provides an overview of recent state legislation addressing this
issue. Finally, this note identifies the most effective approach to
achieve the goal of ending disenfranchisement and proposes a
workable method to address the disparate impact on minorities.
I.

APPROACHES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT LITIGATION

Litigation is one of the most frequently used methods to
address concerns about felony disenfranchisement.27 Lawsuits
have typically focused on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection clause or the Voting Rights Act to challenge
disenfranchisement laws.28 In state courts, litigants also derive
arguments from state constitutional provisions.29
A. The Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”30 The original
purpose of the clause was to assure equal treatment for former
slaves in the post-Civil War period.31 Eventually, the clause was
interpreted to require that governmental classifications be

26

See H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999) (granting ex-felons the right to vote
in federal elections).
27
See infra Part I.A.C (analyzing the different approaches to felony
disenfranchisement litigation).
28
See infra Part I.A (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause is used
to attack felony disenfranchisement laws); see also Part I.B (discussing how
the Voting Rights Act is used to attack felony disenfranchisement laws).
29
See infra Part I.C (explaining how felony disenfranchisement laws are
challenged in state courts).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
31
See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 986, 628 (13th ed. 1997) (stating that the 14th Amendment’s most
obvious and fundamental purpose was to address governmental racial
discrimination).
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reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation.32 The
evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the clause
created different levels of scrutiny to determine whether a state
action, law or classification has violated the clause.33 The most
lenient type of review uses a “rational basis” standard to uphold
the governmental classification as long as it bears a rational
relationship to a legitimate objective.34 The middle level standard
requires that the means chosen by the government must be
substantially related to an important objective.35 Finally, the
32

Id.
Id. at 629-30. The levels are rational review, middle level review and
strict scrutiny. Id.
34
Id. at 635. This standard requires only that a rational connection exist
between a statute’s classification and the governmental purpose. Id. In other
words, the means must “reasonably relate” to the ends. Id. at 629. The
rational basis standard permits legislatures to act broadly and only minimally
requires that the means “fit” the ends. Id. at 635. Its use is typified by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106 (1949) (upholding a statute that prohibited advertising on the sides of
vehicles because the classification was rationally related to the purpose of the
statute to increase public safety). In Railway Express, the agency argued that
the classification had no relation to the safety issue because some distracting
advertisements are outlawed while others that may be damaging to public
safety are not. Id. at 110. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require that “all evils of the same genus be
eradicated.” Id.; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)
(finding that a state could reasonably require certain businesses to remain
closed on Sundays in order to protect the general public’s interest in health and
encourage the “recreational atmosphere of the day”). In McGowan, the Court
stated that “[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”
Id. at 425.
35
GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 631-32. This standard, while not explicitly
acknowledged by a majority of the Court, has nonetheless been utilized in
cases. Id. The intermediate standard is more intensive than the rational basis
review as it requires that the classifications are “important” and the means
have a “persuasive justification.” Id. at 632. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (declaring invalid a statute prohibiting the sale of beer to
males under 21 and females under 18 for traffic safety purposes because the
gender distinction did not “serve important governmental objectives” and was
not “substantially related” to the achievement of traffic safety).
33
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strictest level of review upholds a classification only if the law is
necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.36 Strict
scrutiny is applied to any law that is based on a suspect
classification or affects a fundamental right.37
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of

36

GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 630. In the 1960s the Court articulated a
new approach to the Equal Protection Clause that required the presence of
either a suspect class or an impact on a fundamental right. Id.; see infra note
37 (explaining the categories that require application of strict scrutiny review).
The means must be necessary to achieve the ends and justified by a compelling
state interest. Id. In equal protection cases that involve suspect classes, the
Court has rarely found compelling state interests because classifications
involving suspect classes are rigidly scrutinized. Id. at 664. In order to justify
such a classification, the state must demonstrate that the law is essential for a
public need. Id. For example, in Korematsu v. United States, the Court found
that a law excluding Japanese people from certain areas on the West Coast
constituted a “pressing public necessity” in light of the “real military dangers”
that existed during World War II. 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944). While this
decision has been extensively criticized, it is a noticeable example of the Court
upholding a law that directly impacts a suspect class. Id. More commonly,
however, equal protection cases involve the Court striking down legislation
that impermissibly affects a suspect class. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia statute that prohibited inter-racial
marriages because the law had no legitimate purpose that necessarily justified
its existence).
37
GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 630. Race is the principal suspect class
that always requires strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984) (reversing a state court custody decision that took away custody rights
from a mother after she married an African American); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a Florida statute that proscribed the
cohabitation of interracial married couples); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886) (reversing the decision to imprison a Chinese alien who was
refused a permit for operating his laundry because the administration of the
law was purposely directed at a class of people). The right to vote has been
referred to as a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. See Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a law that
required voters in a school district election to own real property in the district
or have children enrolled in the district because the statute did not promote a
compelling state interest); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966) (establishing that a poll tax is unconstitutional because it infringes upon
the fundamental right to vote).
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felony disenfranchisement in Richardson v. Ramirez.38 In
Ramirez, California ex-felons challenged a state law that denied
them the right to vote.39 The plaintiffs claimed that the statute
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.40 Although this argument was accepted by the
California Supreme Court,41 the United States Supreme Court
rejected it, determining that the strict scrutiny required by section
one of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to ex-felons
because section two permits states to restrict convicted criminals’
right to vote.42 Section two provides that a state’s representation
may be reduced if the vote is denied to qualified individuals,
excluding those who have participated in “rebellion, or other
crime.”43 The Court interpreted this section as permitting the
state to deny ex-felons the right to vote.44 Therefore, equal
protection did not apply to ex-felons because section two is an
“affirmative sanction” of criminal behavior.45 This decision
38

418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Id. at 26. The ex-felons challenged both Article XX, section 11 of the
California Constitution, which required the adoption of laws that exclude
convicted persons from voting, and sections 310, 321, 383, 389, 390, 14240,
and 14246 of the California Elections Code as the sections that enforce the
mandate of the constitution. Id.
40
Id. at 33. Ramirez claimed that California must articulate a compelling
state interest in order to justify the denial of the right to vote by the class of
ex-felons. Id. According to Ramirez, because the state could not find such an
interest, the statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing
disenfranchisement violated the Equal Protection clause. Id.
41
Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (1973). The California court
examined whether the statutory scheme disenfranchising ex-felons was the
least burdensome way the state could regulate the electoral system, and
concluded that it was not. Id. at 212. Instead, the court determined that
disenfranchisement was not necessary for the state to effectively regulate the
voting process. Id. at 216.
42
“[W]hen the vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2
(emphasis added); Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54.
43
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
44
Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54.
45
Id.
39
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drastically limited the ability to challenge disenfranchisement
laws on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, and subsequent
circuit court cases reflect this futility.46
Although the Supreme Court ruled that denying the right to
vote to ex-felons is permissible under section two of the
Fourteenth Amendment,47 the Court thereafter invalidated a
disenfranchisement law in Hunter v. Underwood.48 In Hunter, the
Court found that two factors must be met to establish that a
disenfranchisement law violates the Equal Protection clause.49
First, the plaintiff must prove that the disputed law was
conceived and written with racially discriminatory intent.50
46

See, e.g., Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the plaintiff did not establish that the state’s act intended to or had the
effect of denying the right to vote based on race); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d
388 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing felon’s claim that Mississippi’s Constitution
unfairly denied him the right to vote because the constitution was amended
since its original enactment, removing any discriminatory intent); Baker v.
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court’s decision to
dismiss ex-felons’ complaint that the New York election law
disproportionately deprived blacks of their right to vote); Buckner v. Schaefer,
36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that there was no evidence that a
Maryland statute disenfranchising ex-felons was intended to or is being applied
in a discriminatory manner); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1983)
(declaring that a state may rationally decide to disenfranchise ex-felons);
Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the state
classifications disenfranchising ex-felons bear a rational relationship to the
state’s interest in limiting the franchise to responsible voters).
47
Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55.
48
471 U.S. 222 (1985).
49
Id. at 225.
50
Id. Discriminatory intent exists when a court finds that discrimination
is a substantial or motivating factor in the adoption of the statute. Underwood
v. Hunter, 730 F.2d. 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984). To determine whether
discrimination was a motivating factor, a court must look at a variety of
factors, including the historical background of the decision, legislative history
and the impact of the decision on the affected group. Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 525, 566-68 (1977); see also City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Supreme Court agreed with the
lower court that the provision in Alabama’s 1901 Constitution that permitted
disenfranchisement of any person who was convicted of any crime involving
“moral turpitude” constituted an impermissibly broad category that included
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Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that such a law has a
disproportionate impact on a protected class.51 If both of these
factors are established, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection clause is violated.52
Ultimately in Hunter the Supreme Court found that a
provision of the Alabama Constitution that disenfranchised those
convicted of misdemeanors of “moral turpitude” was originally
adopted with intent to discriminate and had the intended impact
on a protected class.53 The Court further stipulated that in order
to violate the Equal Protection clause, disenfranchisement statutes
must have been adopted solely to discriminate and would not
have been adopted but for that intent.54 Therefore, the Court held
that the provision violated the Equal Protection clause.55
Hunter is significant in that it provides an Equal Protection
within its scope both felonies and misdemeanors. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226.
The framers believed these selected crimes were committed more frequently
by blacks. Id. at 227.
51
Id. A law has a disproportionate impact when it is demonstrated that
one group in society is affected more than another. Id. For example, in Hunter
the lower court found that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution
disenfranchised ten times as many blacks as whites. Id. at 228. Laws that
affect a protected or suspect class are always analyzed using the strict scrutiny
standard. See supra note 37 (elaborating on protected and suspect classes).
The Supreme Court indicated that the racial impact of the provision was not
contested. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228.
52
Id. at 233.
53
Id.; ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901). The Alabama Constitution
denied the vote to those convicted of “any . . . crime involving moral
turpitude,” which was later defined by the Alabama Supreme Court to mean
an act that is “immoral in itself, regardless of the fact whether it is punishable
by law.” Pippin v. State, 73 So. 340, 342 (1916) (quoting Fort v. Brinkley,
112 S.W. 1084 (1908)); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226.
54
Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. Using the standard articulated in Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 525 (1977), the Court required
that proof is necessary to indicate that the questioned statute was enacted with
the intent to discriminate and did not serve any other purpose than to
discriminate. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. The Court also reiterated that once a
plaintiff demonstrates that racial discrimination was a substantial factor in the
creation of the law, the defense must then prove that the law would have been
enacted even without this factor. Id. at 228.
55
Id. at 224.
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avenue to attack disenfranchisement laws.56 This case lessens the
impact of Ramirez by demonstrating that disenfranchisement
lawsuits can still be successful.57 Given the extensive
discriminatory purpose in many of the states that continue to
deny ex-felons access to the ballot box, the first factor in Hunter
requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent should not be a
difficult obstacle to face.58
Few lawsuits, however, have been successful in applying the
Hunter rule to similar statutes because the presence of
discriminatory intent was ambiguous.59 In Cotton v. Fordice, the
Fifth Circuit recognized that section 241 of the Mississippi
Constitution was enacted in 1890 with discriminatory intent.60
The
court
reasoned,
however,
that
because
the
disenfranchisement provision was amended several times since
1890 to remove sections that may have been intentionally
discriminatory, the provision was not unconstitutional since the

56

Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 33.
58
Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548. Shapiro notes that the history of
disenfranchisement in the Southern states is especially apparent. Id. This is
demonstrated by the results of constitutional conventions that took place after
the Civil War. Id. at 541. Mississippi’s 1890 constitution is an example of
intentional discrimination using disenfranchisement. See MISS. CONST. art.
VII, § 241 (1890); supra note 9 (discussing section 241). Mississippi’s
approach was mirrored at the constitutional conventions of other states,
including South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia. Shapiro, supra
note 2, at 541.
59
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D.
Miss. 1995). In McLaughlin, the District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi declined to decide whether Section 241 of the Mississippi
Constitution was enacted with racially discriminatory intent. Id. at 978. While
the court conceded that this was possible, the issue was not fully addressed
because the court had already decided that the plaintiff’s conviction of false
pretenses was a misdemeanor, not a felony. Id. at 976. Because misdemeanors
are not included among the class of crimes for which punishment may include
disenfranchisement, Ramirez did not apply in this case and the issue of intent
was irrelevant. Id. at 976-78.
60
157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); see supra note 9 (discussing section
241).
57
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amendments were not adopted with the intent to discriminate.61
Recently, in Howard v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit dismissed
the possibility of discriminatory intent because the constitutional
provision disenfranchising ex-felons existed before the enactment
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the extension of
the right to vote to blacks.62 Other cases reflect the tendency
among courts to dismiss disenfranchisement cases with little or
no discussion regarding discriminatory intent.63
The outcomes of these cases reflect that while Hunter permits
Equal Protection dialogue in some disenfranchisement cases, its
scope is narrow and thus limited in utility. In conjunction with
Ramirez, the standard set by Hunter significantly restricts
constitutional argumentation.64 Therefore, litigation challenging
disenfranchisement laws must focus on theories not confined by
U.S. Constitutional claims.65 The ability to change such laws
61

Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391-92. Section 241 was amended in 1950 to
remove “burglary” from the list of eligible crimes. Id. It was also amended in
1968 to include “murder” and “rape,” crimes that historically were not
considered “black crimes.” Id. Because the plaintiff did not offer any evidence
that the amendments were enacted with discriminatory intent, the court
assumed that they were not enacted with discriminatory intent. Id.
62
205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000). The court also based its decision on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
giving express permission to the states to deny the right to vote to convicted
criminals. Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the
Supreme Court’s rationale in Ramirez).
63
See Buckner v. Schaefer, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
plaintiffs provided no evidence that the statute in question was intended to
discriminate); see also Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting
that a state could rationally decide to exclude convicted ex-felons from
voting); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1979) (declaring that
the classifications of ex-felons bore a rational relation to the state’s interest in
limiting access to the franchise to responsible voters).
64
Because Ramirez holds that the strict scrutiny required by section 1
does not apply to ex-felons, the possibility of invalidating a law under the
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to section 2. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54. This
avenue is further restricted by the Hunter standard, however, and thus makes
it more difficult to pursue disenfranchisement claims using the Constitution.
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 224.
65
See infra Part I.C. (discussing state court litigation focusing on state
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without a favorable Supreme Court ruling is a fundamental
problem facing litigants.
B. The Voting Rights Act
Disenfranchised litigants have also attempted to use the
Voting Rights Act in conjunction with the Equal Protection
clause.66 Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act (“the Act”) in
1965 to combat continuing racial discrimination in the South by
enabling black voters to challenge existing voting barriers.67 The
Southern states were targeted specifically because state and local
governmental officials evaded the provisions of the Fifteenth
Amendment by utilizing discriminatory devices such as literacy
tests to prevent blacks from voting.68
constitutional claims).
66
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001).
67
GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 985-86. The Act prohibits voting
qualifications that “result in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. §
1973(2)(a). See Robert Barnes, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and
Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1209 (1985)
(stating that the main purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to provide a
remedy for racially motivated obstruction of voting rights).
68
GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 986. In particular, Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and North Carolina were
singled out because of the continued existence of literacy tests or similar
devices throughout the spring of 1965. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights
Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 18-19
(Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). In addition to literacy
tests, Southern states also created barriers such as grandfather clauses,
property qualifications and character tests in order to prevent illiterate whites
from being denied the right to vote. Charlotte Marx Harper, Lopez v.
Monterey County: A Remedy Gone Too Far?, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 438
(2000). For example, a grandfather clause entitled anyone who was a
descendant of someone who was historically entitled to vote to be excused
from taking the literacy test. Gregory A. Caldiera, Litigation, Lobbying, and
the Voting Rights Bar, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 230, 232
(Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). In addition, because
less than two-thirds of blacks in many Southern states in 1890 knew how to
read, requiring the completion of a registration form effectively prevented
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The Supreme Court effectively limited the Act’s impact in
City of Mobile v. Bolden, however, when it decided that
discriminatory intent must be shown in order to establish a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or section two of the
Voting Rights Act.69 Bolden was a class action initiated on behalf
of the black residents of the city of Mobile, Alabama.70 The
plaintiffs alleged that the town’s practice of electing the city
commissioners at large by the city’s entire voting population
unfairly diluted the strength of their vote in such elections and
thus violated section two of the Act.71 The Court focused on prior
cases that required plaintiffs to show that the disputed plan was
“conceived or operated as [a] purposeful [device] to further
racial . . . discrimination.”72 Because this standard was
particularly difficult to prove, many pending lawsuits at the time
of Bolden based on section two faced stiffer resistance from the
local governments and were dropped.73
In response to Bolden, Congress amended the Act in 1982 to
create a “results” test that would specifically apply to voting
most blacks from voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311
(1966).
69
446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states that
“[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
1973(2)(a) (2001).
70
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58.
71
Id. at 58-60.
72
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970); see also Kilgarlin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1964).
73
Frank R. Parker, The Impact of City of Mobile v. Bolden and
Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting Rights Cases in its Wake, in THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION REPORT 98, 111-12.
(Rockefeller Foundation, ed., 1981). After Bolden, lawsuits on behalf of
residents in other Alabama towns such as Jackson, Hattiesburg, Greenwood
and Greenville were unsuccessful. Id.; see also Laughlin McDonald, The 1982
Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING 66, 67 (Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds.,
1992).
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rights litigation.74 The amendment establishes that a reviewing
court must look to the “totality of circumstances” present when
considering a voting discrimination claim.75 By enacting a results
test, Congress directed the courts to consider several “typical”
factors listed in the Senate Judiciary Committee report addressing
the 1982 amendment.76 The amendment’s supporters attempted to
restore the moderate legal standard that existed prior to Bolden.77
74

Timothy G. O’Rourke, The 1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights
Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 85, 98 (Bernard Groffman
& Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). A results test requires that a challenge
based on the Voting Rights Act must prove discriminatory results only without
requiring proof of intent. Davidson, supra note 68, at 39.
75
42 U.S.C. § 1973(2)(b).
A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.
Id.; see also GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 990 (discussing the totality of the
circumstances standard in section 2 of the Act).
76
Voting Rights Act Extension Report of the S. Comm. on the J., 97th
Cong. 28-9 (1982); O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 99. The report listed several
factors.
[A] history of official racial discrimination in voting; racially
polarized voting; practices such as majority-vote rules that may
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; a discriminatory slating
process; socioeconomic disparities that impede minority political
participation; racial appeals in campaigns; and the lack of minority
electoral success. Two additional factors included the absence of
official responsiveness to minority group interests and a tenuous
policy in support of the challenged voting practice.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Congress derived these factors from White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), in which the Supreme Court declared that
minority groups must be given equal opportunity to vote and declared unlawful
practices that had the effect of creating unequal opportunities based on race.
McDonald, supra note 73, at 66. This effect could be shown by the presence
of any of the factors; evidence of intent was not necessary. Id.; see supra note
75 for the text of the Act.
77
McDonald, supra note 73, at 66. Before Bolden, the Court held in
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Although the amendment was intended to ease a plaintiff’s
difficulties in meeting the intent standard, few disenfranchisement
cases have been successful since it was passed.78 Even when exfelons refer to the Act to claim that disenfranchisement denies
them the right to vote based on race, state and federal courts still
require them to prove both specific discriminatory intent and
impact in order to invalidate the law.79 Therefore, because courts
have disregarded congressional reasoning behind the amendment,
the changes have virtually no impact on the legal standard.80
Wesley v. Collins was the first federal case to address the
1982 amendment.81 In Wesley, the Sixth Circuit rejected a
disenfranchised felon’s claim that the Tennessee Voting Rights
Act unfairly denied him the right to vote.82 While the Wesley
court conceded that the 1982 amendment was designed so that
“the challenging party need not prove discriminatory intent to
establish a violation,” it held that the plaintiff failed to
demonstrate that the “totality of the circumstances” resulted in a
violation of the Act.83 Tennessee’s history of racial discrimination
White v. Regester that states may not deny minorities an equal opportunity to
vote. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). Unequal opportunity may be proven by any of a
number of factors, see supra note 76, and specific proof of intent was not
necessary. Id. at 67. Therefore, the standard in place pre-Bolden was easier
for Voting Rights Act litigants to prove. Id.
78
See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases
with ineffective Voting Rights Act claims).
79
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791
F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). See infra Part I.B (discussing federal cases that
evaluated the application of the 1982 amendment to felony disenfranchisement
claims).
80
See supra note 63 (providing examples of cases where the legal
standard has remained the same).
81
791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
82
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1981). The Tennessee Voting Rights
Act of 1981 provides that “any person who has been convicted of an infamous
crime in Tennessee . . . shall not be permitted to register to vote or to vote in
any election.” Id.; see also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257.
83
Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260. The court reasoned that the lower court’s
emphasis on the evidence of the effects of past discrimination was misplaced
because this factor alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation of the Voting
Rights Act. Id.
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was not sufficient to establish a violation despite evidence that the
state’s Voting Rights Act disproportionately affected blacks.84
Instead, the court declared that the rationale behind the law was
both legitimate and compelling, based on the holding in Ramirez
that criminal disenfranchisement is constitutionally permissible.85
Therefore, even though Wesley contains an acknowledgment of
Congress’ attempt to make the standard more lenient, its outcome
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit continues to adhere to the
heightened intent standard set by Bolden.86
Courts in other circuits have also refused to utilize the results
standard.87 This indicates that congressional directives supportive
of modifying disenfranchisement laws may ultimately have little
value when faced with court decisions that reflect the current
Supreme Court’s tendency to limit congressional power.88
84

Id. The court refers to the district court’s finding that the historical
presence of racial discrimination in Tennessee continues to have effects in the
present day, including the resulting disproportionate impact on blacks who are
convicted of felonies at a significantly higher rate than whites. Id. at 1260.
85
Id. at 1261. To justify the state’s rationale, the court cited the Lockean
theory that one who breaks society’s laws is authorizing the government to
take away certain rights, including voting rights. Id.; see supra note 10
(discussing the social contract theory of John Locke). The court also
emphasized that it is reasonable for a state to decide to take away the voting
privilege from those who commit serious crimes. Id. at 1261-62. The act of
disenfranchisement is taken against an individual as a result of their
participation in a preascertained, proscribed criminal act, rather than against a
group of citizens as a whole and thus does not violate equal protection,
according to the court. Id. at 1262.
86
446 U.S. 55 (1980); 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). Some believe the
plaintiff’s fulfillment of both disparate racial impact and historical
discrimination should have been sufficient to constitute a Voting Rights Act
violation. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 550; see also Harvey, supra note 17, at
1186 (questioning the Wesley court’s claim that plaintiffs suing under section 2
of the Voting Rights Act must demonstrate that discriminatory intent was
present in the enactment of the disputed statute, which contradicts the purpose
of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act).
87
Jones v. Edgar, 3 F.Supp.2d 979 (C.D. Ill. 1998); Farrakhan v.
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wa 1997).
88
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of
Boerne, the Court held that Congress does not have the power to define
substantive aspects of the Constitution. Id. at 519. This case restricts federal
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Nevertheless, potential for reform on the federal circuit level
is still a possibility. In the Second Circuit, felons brought a
lawsuit challenging New York’s election law that denied inmates
and paroled felons the vote based on the results test.89 The
inmates’ original claim was dismissed by the district court of the
Southern District of New York.90 On appeal, five judges voted to
allow felons to pursue Voting Rights Act claims, stating that
“[w]hile a State may choose to disenfranchise some, all or none
of its ex-felons based on legitimate concerns, it may not do so
based upon distinctions that have the effect, whether intentional
or not, of disenfranchising felons because of their race.”91
Furthermore, the judges in support of the plaintiffs’ claims
minimized the need to demonstrate specific past discrimination in
the state in order to establish a Voting Rights Act claim.92
Instead, the judges classified it as one of several factors to be
considered.93 A split among the judges resulted in the lawsuit’s
statutes that may have the effect of granting or lessening rights granted by the
Bill of Rights. Id. “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. Because
the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendment lessens the standard required by
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in voting rights cases, it is possible
that the Court may hold that utilization of the results-oriented standard is
unconstitutional. Id. at 525. See also GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 525 (13th
ed. Supp. 2000) (noting that Boerne is the first in a line of cases that suggest
“that Congress must demonstrate a clear justification for the exercise of its
civil rights enforcement power against the states”). Thus, congressional
attempts to remedy disenfranchisement may not be useful in changing laws.
Id.
89
Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996). The felons brought suit to
challenge N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2)-(5) (2002). Baker, 85 F.3d at 920. The
case was originally filed as Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
90
Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). At trial, the felons’
action was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Id. A panel of the trial court reversed this decision. Id. The
defendants sought review in the Court of Appeals. Id.
91
Baker, 85 F.3d at 937 (emphasis added).
92
Id. at 937-38.
93
Id. at 938. Judge Feinberg used literacy tests as a comparative
example. Id. at 937. When the Court upheld the ban on literacy tests in

PRICEMACRO11-23.DOC

390

4/1/03 2:49 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

dismissal without precedential effect.94 Nevertheless, this split
demonstrates that results-test arguments can be influential.95
The reasoning in Baker favoring the results-test rationale
indicates that the 1982 Amendment to the Voting Rights Act does
not unacceptably push the limits of Congress’ enforcement power
of the Equal Protection Clause into unconstitutional boundaries.96
Despite the lack of a clear victory, Baker demonstrates that the
results test of the Act will be influential in changing felon
disenfranchisement laws.97 While several constitutional issues
remain in question,98 this method is not completely devoid of
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), it did so without proof of
congressional violations in every state. Baker, 85 F.3d at 937.
94
Baker, 85 F.3d at 921; see also Shapiro, supra note 17, at 3. Ten
judges on the Second Circuit sat en banc and were evenly divided as to the
merits of the case. Id. Because there was no majority opinion, the lower
court’s order to dismiss the ex-felons’ claims was affirmed. Id.
95
See Baker, 85 F.3d at 934 (Feinberg, J., separate opinion). Judge
Feinberg’s alternative view represented the concerns of the five judges who
voted to allow plaintiffs to argue that the results test set out in section 2 of the
1982 Amendment negated the necessity of demonstrating discriminatory
intent. Id. These judges constitute half of the panel that heard the case. Id.
96
Baker, 85 F.3d at 937. Judge Feinberg wrote, “I see no persuasive
reason, in view of Hunter, why Congress may not use its enforcing power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment
to bar racially discriminatory results, as it did in the Voting Rights Act.” Id.
97
Id. The fact that half of the judges sitting to hear Baker on the Second
Circuit agreed that such a claim may be made indicates a possibility that likeminded judges exist in other circuits, or that judges are gradually becoming
more favorable toward disenfranchisement cases based on the 1982
amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Id.
98
Id. Aside from issues of the scope of congressional power referenced
by City of Boerne, the Voting Rights Act is also tainted by the applicability of
the plain statement rule, which requires an explicit statement of intent from
Congress when altering its usual balance with the states. Id. at 938. The
question remains whether this rule applies to the Voting Rights Act. Id. Judge
Feinberg argued that application of the Voting Rights Amendment to state
disenfranchisement does not upset the balance because the Act follows in the
path of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which were specific
expansions of federal power. Id. Furthermore, the Court declined to apply the
plain statement rule to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). Baker, 85 F.3d at 937.
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promise.99
C. State Court Litigation
Chances for success in felony disenfranchisement lawsuits
may be greater within the state court system. State court lawsuits
attacking disenfranchisement laws have taken various
approaches.100 Some claims have focused on the irregular
application of laws to particular segments of the felony
population.101 Other lawsuits have made broader arguments based
on the unconstitutionality of specific provisions of state
constitutions.102
Mixon v. Commonwealth is a key example of a successful
disenfranchisement lawsuit focusing on specific groups within the
disenfranchised population.103 In Mixon, ex-felons who had
completed
their
sentences
challenged
provisions
of
99

See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fl. 2002). A Florida
federal appeals court will have a chance to create positive change when they
review a recent decision made by the Southern District of Florida. Id. Johnson
is an action brought by a group of ex-felons on behalf of all convicted exfelons in Florida contending that the state’s disenfranchisement laws violate
the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments as well as
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson, 214 F.
Supp. 2d at 4, 5. On July 18, 2002, the Florida District Court granted
summary judgment to the defendants on all counts. Id. at 31. The Brennan
Center for Justice, the organization representing the plaintiffs, is planning to
appeal. See Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Brennan Center
Statement on Decision in Johnson v. Bush (July 17, 2002), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/ pressrelease-2002-0618.html.
100
See, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000); Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000).
101
See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 453 (declaring that the state unlawfully denied
ex-felons who were imprisoned within the past five years the right to register
to vote).
102
Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000) (holding that New
Hampshire’s felon disenfranchisement statutes did not violate plaintiff’s right
to vote under the New Hampshire Constitution); Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445
(Mont. 1978) (declaring that the Montana Constitution and state statutes do not
unconstitutionally deny convicted ex-felons the right to vote).
103
759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
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Pennsylvania’s Voter Registration Act, which prohibited exfelons released from prison for less than five years from
registering to vote.104 The court found no rational basis existed to
distinguish ex-felons who had not registered to vote before
serving prison sentences from those who had registered prior to
their prison terms and were, therefore, permitted to vote upon
release.105
The Mixon decision has both negative and positive
implications for felony disenfranchisement.106 The court
reaffirmed the principle set forth in Ramirez that felony
disenfranchisement does not violate the Constitution.107 The
decision to invalidate the unconstitutional provision of
Pennsylvania’s Voter Registration Act, however, resulted in the
restoration of voting rights for thousands of ex-felons.108 The fact
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was willing to declare some
voting restrictions invalid is encouraging, and this case is a
helpful model for ex-felons in other states. Because this decision
focuses on a narrow group of individuals, however, it has limited
applicability to general disenfranchisement claims.109
104

Id. at 451; Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act, 25 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 961.101-.5109 (1995).
105
Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. See supra Part I.A (explaining the rational
basis test).
106
Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. The court stated, “[A]lthough a state may not
only disenfranchise all convicted ex-felons it may also distinguish among
them, but the distinction must be such that it is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.” Id. This illustrates that, while the court’s use of
Ramirez limits the number of ex-felons who are affected by the decision, the
fact that the court decides that the Voter Registration Act provision was not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest improves the status of many
formerly disenfranchised ex-felons. Id.
107
759 A.2d at 449.
108
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 2.
109
The result in this case was based on the lack of a rational basis to
justify denying the vote to ex-felons who had not registered before their
sentence while permitting those who had already registered to vote. Mixon,
759 A.2d at 451. The court relied upon the Third Circuit decision in Owens v.
Barnes that prohibits distinguishing among disenfranchised convicted felons if
the distinction is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 711 F.2d
25 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. This rationale is
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The second, broader approach to disenfranchisement lawsuits
focuses on violations of state constitutional provisions.110 This
approach would be more fruitful when attacking a
disenfranchisement statute in its entirety.111 The use of state
constitutional analysis to confront disenfranchisement laws has
been infrequently utilized, and, therefore, this approach has the
potential to restore voting rights to millions.112 This is especially
true in states that continue to disenfranchise ex-felons after
completion of parole.113 The most prominent, albeit unsuccessful,
important for specific groups of future ex-felons who are denied the vote while
other similarly situated ex-felons are not because of a particular factor that
occurs in some ex-felons but not in others and does not meet the rational basis
test. Id. An example would be disenfranchising blue-eyed ex-felons but not
their brown-eyed counterparts. Id. In order to use this case in other
disenfranchisement lawsuits, a specific factor must be present that would apply
only to a certain percentage of ex-felons who are affected by the arbitrary
distinction. Id. This type of argument may or may not result in ending
disenfranchisement for a significant number of ex-felons, depending on the
size of the particular group affected and the frequency with which the
irrational distinction is made. Therefore, Mixon may not be useful in broader
disenfranchisement claims.
110
See infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing a New
Hampshire case that asserted that the state’s felon disenfranchisement statutes
violated the state constitution); see also Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321
(N.H. 2000).
111
See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. In contrast with the result in Mixon,
where only the voting rights of those ex-felons who had not registered to vote
before committing a felony were restored, a successful attack on a
disenfranchisement statute or constitutional provision using a constitutional
argument would restore voting rights to a larger percentage of ex-felons
because the result would apply to all ex-felons. Id.
112
See Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321, 323 (N.H. 2000) (overruling
the lower court’s declaration that New Hampshire’s felon disenfranchisement
statutes violated the state’s constitution). State constitutional analysis can be
applied to the felon population as a whole, rather than specific groups who
have particular grievances that do not apply to all ex-felons. Thus, this type of
lawsuit would have the most impact on the greatest number of ex-felons.
113
FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 7. In Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, Virginia and Wyoming, more than four percent of their respective
adult populations are disenfranchised even after completion of parole. Id. A
repeal of disenfranchisement laws in these states would drastically increase the
nation’s population eligible to vote. Id.
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attempt to achieve such a result occurred in New Hampshire.114
In Fischer v. Governor, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
examined whether the state felon disenfranchisement statutes
violated the state constitution.115 The court used a reasonableness
standard to evaluate the state’s interest in limiting the franchise in
relation to the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining voting rights.116 The
court evaluated the state’s argument that by committing a crime,
the felon violated “the social contract” that creates the foundation
of a democracy.117 In determining this rationale to be valid, the
court declared that it is not unreasonable to expect society to
exclude such individuals from “voting for those who create and
enforce the laws.”118
Although the plaintiff in Fischer was not successful in reenfranchising felons, this result should not completely dissuade
other plaintiffs from utilizing state constitutions in
disenfranchisement challenges.119 The reasonableness standard
used by Fischer is subjective, and the same application in another
state’s court may lead to a different result.120 This method’s
utility has not been fully explored, and it may be particularly

114

See Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000).
749 A.2d 321; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2 (1986) (prohibiting
ex-felons from voting in elections); RSA 654:5 (1996) (stating that ex-felons’
civil rights as listed in the New Hampshire Code section 607-A:2 are forfeited
as a result of the conviction); N.H. CONST. part I art. 11 (amended 1984).
116
749 A.2d at 329.
117
Id.; see supra note 10 (discussing the Lockean theory of the social
contract).
118
Id. According to the court, the legislature acted properly given that
disenfranchisement is a reasonable reaction to the commission of a felony. Id.
at 330. The court attempts to provide additional examples of the legislature’s
erudite discretion by stating that only criminals convicted of the “most serious
offenses” are disenfranchised. Id.
119
See Fischer v. Governor, No. 98 E402 (N.H. Super. Ct. Oct. 27,
1998). The ruling by the lower court that the disenfranchisement statutes
violated the New Hampshire Constitution is an indication that there are some
judges who are willing to consider state constitutional challenges to
disenfranchisement. Id. Because a state court decision is not binding on
another state’s judicial system, the result in Fischer is merely persuasive.
120
Fischer, 749 A.2d at 329.
115
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successful in states where ex-felons do not have the right to
vote.121 When using the state constitution, litigants have more
latitude in arguing constitutional violations if the focus is on the
reasonableness of preventing ex-felons from voting rather than on
the reasonableness of preventing felons currently in prison from
voting.122 This argument would be favored by a court willing to
expand the rights of individuals who have completed their
sentence and are subsequently contributing to society in a positive
manner.123
II. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT
Recently,
legislative
proposals
have
addressed
disenfranchisement more substantially than the court system.124
On the federal level, legislators have begun to address the issue
by introducing legislation in Congress.125 State legislatures have
been active in establishing task forces to contemplate changes to
disenfranchisement statutes.126 Additionally, several state
121

See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3. These include
Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi, Nevada and Wyoming. Id.
122
See, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000) (declaring invalid a denial of voting rights to certain ex-felons while
establishing that no violation occurred in the disenfranchisement of currently
incarcerated ex-felons). Courts seem to be more willing to find violations of
state constitutions in cases involving ex-felons who have completed their
sentences rather than in cases involving current prisoners. Id. at 448.
123
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 10, at 17 (describing the story of
Rosetta Meeks, convicted of a drug felony in 1993 and permanently barred
from voting in Florida despite her efforts to contribute to her community,
including teaching computer skills to low-income people).
124
See, e.g., H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 495, 2001 (Md.
2001); S.B. 208, 1999 (Fla. 1999); A.J.R 6, 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999).
125
H.R. 906. Representative Conyers introduced this bill “[t]o secure the
Federal voting rights of persons who have been released from incarceration.”
Id. Representatives Martin Frost of Texas, Charles Rangel of New York and
Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas were among those who also supported this bill.
Id.
126
Green, supra note 16, at B1. The Virginia State Crime Commission
created a task force in June 2001 to study the restoration of civil rights for ex-
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legislators have proposed state constitutional amendments.127
A. Federal Legislation
The most recent federal legislation dealing with felony
disenfranchisement is H.R. 906, presented to the House of
Representatives in 1999 by Michigan Representative John
Conyers.128 The primary objective of this bill, referred to as the
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, is to restore
the federal voting rights of ex-felons.129 The Act authorizes the
Attorney General to initiate declaratory or injunctive relief
against states that violate its provisions.130 It also entitles those
who would be affected by a violation of the Act to provide notice
to the chief election official of the state.131 Although this Act died
in the Judiciary Committee, the issues raised in a congressional
subcommittee hearing on the Act provide insight into future
difficulties similar bills might face.132
One of these issues addresses whether Congress’ supervisory
power over federal elections is sufficient to justify federal
felons. Id. In Maryland, the state legislature formed the Task Force to Study
Repealing the Disenfranchisement of Convicted Ex-felons. H.R. 495, 2001
(Md. 2001).
127
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 6. In 1999, Florida Senator James
Hargrett introduced a bill that would lift a constitutional requirement that exfelons initiate the restoration of their civil rights in order to vote or hold
office. S.B. 208, 1999 (Fla. 1999); see also ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4,
at 6. Also in 1999, Nevada Assemblyman Wendell Williams proposed a
constitutional amendment that would automatically restore the right to vote to
ex-felons. A.J.R 6, 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999); see also ALLARD & MAUER,
supra note 4, at 8.
128
H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999).
129
Id. Shortly after its introduction, the bill was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee and then to the Subcommittee on the Constitution.
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12.
130
H.R. 906; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12.
131
H.R. 906; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12.
132
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R.
906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearing]; see also ALLARD &
MAUER, supra note 4, at 12.
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interference in an area traditionally left to the states.133 Gillian
Metzger, a staff attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice at
New York University School of Law, argued at the subcommittee
hearing that such questions should not prevent the passage of the
1999 Act.134 Metzger asserted that the Elections Clause of Article
I, Section 4 of the Constitution gives Congress very broad power
to regulate federal elections.135 She also maintained that the Act
represents a congressional policy judgment regarding felony
disenfranchisement.136 These policy considerations are validly
enforced through the Elections Clause, which requires states to
defer to Congress regarding the conduct of federal elections.137
133

U.S. CONST. art. I., § 4. The Elections Clause gives power to the
state legislatures to prescribe “the times, places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives,” but it also permits Congress to
“make or alter such regulations.” Id. Some disenfranchisement activists have
indicated that this clause may give Congress the authority to establish
qualifications for federal elections; however, it has never been directly
addressed by the Supreme Court. See ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12
(outlining the comments made by Gillian Metzger, a staff attorney for the
Brennan Center, at a Subcommittee on the Constitution hearing held on
October 21, 1999).
134
Hearing, supra note 132, at 47 (testimony of Gillian Metzger, Brennan
Center staff attorney).
135
Id. at 56. According to Metzger, the Elections Clause was used as the
rationale giving Congress the authority to enact the Federal Election Campaign
Act. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress has a broad
power to “safeguard the legitimacy of federal elections” when the Court
upheld the Corrupt Practices Act, which regulates contributions and
expenditures made to influence the selection of presidential electors. Id.
136
Id. at 48. Metzger stated that H.R. 906 addresses existing disparities
between the states regarding felon participation in federal elections, and
represents a judgment that “such disparities in citizens’ fundamental rights
based on the happenstance of geography are unwarranted, and threaten the
integrity and legitimacy of federal government.” Id.
137
Id. at 47-49. Metzger dismissed an opposing argument that the
Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 (requiring that the qualifications
of the voters in Senate and House elections be the same as qualifications for
voters in the most numerous branch of the state legislature) negates any
implication that Congress has the power to set qualifications for voters in
federal elections. Id. Metzger stated that the intent of the Founders in writing
the Qualifications Clause was to prevent states from enacting laws that result
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Additionally, Metzger argued that Congress’ enforcement powers
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments provide the
authority to adopt the Act since the existence of discriminatory
intent and impact in disenfranchisement laws violate both
amendments.138
In light of the holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, however,
the Court likely would have invalidated the 1999 Act.139 Because
this bill would require states to permit ex-felons to vote in all
federal elections, some states would be required to change their
voting procedures and qualifications.140 This would raise issues
regarding the scope of Congress’ power to enforce federal laws
in the states.141
in some citizens being eligible to vote in state elections but not in
congressional elections. Id.
138
Id. at 49, 55. The right to vote is a fundamental right that is protected
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, giving Congress the authority to
address state laws that impede protected groups’ ability to vote. Id.; see supra
Part I.A (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and
its impact on felony disenfranchisement lawsuits); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text (discussing “fundamental rights”). Metzger states that
criminal disenfranchisement provisions have been enacted to exclude black
voters and continue to have a “substantially greater impact on minorities,
particularly African-American men.” Hearing, supra note 132, at 55; see
supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
“disproportionate impact”). Metzger states that Congress has the power to
adopt remedial legislation even if it prohibits some conduct that is not
unconstitutional. Hearing, supra note 132, at 55. She points to Congress’
power to ban literacy tests, even though such tests may not by themselves
violate the Constitution. Id.; see supra Part I.B (discussing the historical
factors leading up to the Voting Rights Act and the subsequent use of the Act
in felony disenfranchisement legislation); see also supra note 68 (discussing
literacy tests and other restrictions on voting).
139
521 U.S. 507 (1997); see supra note 88 and accompanying text
(describing the current Court’s reluctance to endorse congressional actions that
expand the federal government’s power).
140
H.R. 906, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999). States that do not permit ex-felons
to vote in any election would have to implement procedures so that the exfelons have access to federal elections even if they are still prohibited from
voting in the state elections. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4; see supra notes
12-14 (listing the potentially affected states).
141
GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 984-85. The scope of the federal
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Additionally, a federal disenfranchisement act faces practical
concerns of implementation. If a law were enacted to prohibit the
disenfranchisement of ex-felons in federal elections, state election
officials would be faced with the logistical problem of separating
state and federal ballots.142 Moreover, experts doubt that sponsors
of the act would be able to create a broad coalition sufficient to
pass the bill, given the limited amount of national public
awareness and support for re-enfranchisement.143 Nevertheless,
while disenfranchisement may not be a favored political issue,
the involvement of prominent legislators to modify the laws on a
federal level may create a more receptive atmosphere.144 While
government’s power to create laws that declare certain practices unlawful even
if the Court has not found them to be unconstitutional depends upon whether
such laws are determined by the Court to be “remedial.” Id. Remedial laws
are those that “provide enforcement mechanisms to implement judicially
declared rights.” Id. at 984. The remedial nature of the 1999 Act may be
assessed by the standard set by City of Boerne, which requires a high level of
justification for congressional action taken against the states. Id. at 99. City of
Boerne stated that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes
into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” 521
U.S. at 518 (internal citations omitted). Justice Kennedy further stated that
congressional legislation prohibiting literacy tests and similar requirements
enacted to address racial discrimination in voting was upheld under the
Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause. Id. Because City of Boerne also
stressed that the enforcement power is remedial and does not permit Congress
to decide what is an impermissible constitutional violation, however, the
question whether Congress has the power to force states to re-enfranchise exfelons for federal elections depends upon whether that power is considered
merely remedial in nature or constitutes a substantive determination of
constitutional violations. Id. at 519.
142
Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4.
143
Symposium, Constitutional Lawyering in the 21st Century,
Enfranchising the Disenfranchised, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 249, 283 (2000). Melissa
Saunders, professor at the University of North Carolina and Senior Counsel to
the North Carolina Attorney General, points out that the issue was raised in
the 2000 Democratic Presidential Primary debate and that neither candidate
seemed to think that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons was a problem. Id.
144
H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). The 1999 congressional bill was
introduced by Rep. Conyers and supported by other well-known
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federal efforts are not particularly promising, local legislators
may be more likely to change state disenfranchisement laws
because they operate on a smaller, more flexible scale and are
less likely to be scrutinized by the media and the public.145
B. State Legislation
Several states have passed constitutional amendments and
bills repealing sections of disenfranchisement laws or easing
restrictions on ex-felons.146 Additionally, some states have
recognized the importance of this issue by creating task forces
and committees to gather evidence to support modifying the
existing laws.147 The increase in efforts made in states throughout
the country as well as the presence of bi-partisan cooperation
indicate that state legislation may be the most effective way to
influence disenfranchisement laws.148 Given the increased
representatives, including Charles Rangel of New York, Maxine Waters of
California and Jesse Jackson, Jr. of Illinois. Id.
145
See infra Part II.B (outlining efforts made by state legislatures and
governors to modify existing felony disenfranchisement laws).
146
H.R. 5042, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001) (restoring the
voting rights of convicted ex-felons who are on probation); H.R. 126, 140th
Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000) (amending the Delaware Constitution to permit
persons convicted of certain felonies, excluding murder, sexual offenses,
manslaughter and offenses against public administration including bribery, to
vote after being pardoned or five years after the completion of their
sentences); S.B. 204, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2001 (N.M. 2001) (restoring the
right to vote to convicted ex-felons who have satisfied all sentence conditions).
See also Steve Miller, Rights Advocates and Democrats Seek Vote for Exfelons, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at A3 (reporting that ten states have
considered measures that would loosen felony voting restrictions during the
end of 2000 through the first several months of 2001).
147
See Green, supra note 16, at B1. In 2001, task forces were created in
Maryland and Virginia to contemplate the voting rights of ex-felons. Id. In
June 2001, the Virginia State Crime Commission created a task force to study
the restoration of ex-felons’ civil rights. Id. The Maryland state legislature
formed its own task force focusing on repealing the disenfranchisement of
convicted ex-felons. H.B. 495, 415th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2001 (Md.
2001).
148
See supra Part II.A (discussing federal disenfranchisement action).
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political viability of anti-disenfranchisement rationale in the
states, this approach is likely to create a significant amount of
change in a relatively short time period.
Connecticut, Delaware and New Mexico have made
significant changes to their disenfranchisement laws in recent
years.149 In May 2000, Connecticut Governor John Rowland
signed into law a bill restoring voting rights to ex-felons on
probation.150 The bill was supported by several Republican
leaders in the state legislature and was moved along by the
lobbying efforts of a voting rights coalition that included civil
rights groups as well as governmental agencies such as the
Department of Corrections.151 Because this bill has only been in
effect for less than a year, it is unknown exactly how much
impact it has had on the status of felony disenfranchisement.152
Nevertheless, because there are an estimated 37,000 ex-felons
currently on probation in the state, the bill is likely to have a
significant impact in Connecticut.153
In June 2000, the Delaware General Assembly amended the
state’s constitution to restore voting rights to certain convicted
ex-felons five years after the completion of their sentence.154 The
restoration does not apply to ex-felons convicted of murder,
manslaughter, offenses against public administration involving
bribery or improper influence, sexual offenses or abuse of
office.155
Efforts underway on a state level have been vastly more successful than on the
federal level. See supra Part II.A.
149
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 5 (describing restoration efforts
in Connecticut and Delaware); Miles A. Rapoport, Restoring the Vote, AM.
PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2001, at 1314 (describing efforts in Connecticut and New
Mexico).
150
H.R. 5042, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2001 (Conn. 2001); Rapoport,
supra note 149.
151
Rapoport, supra note 149.
152
H.R. 5042, 2001 Leg. Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2001).
153
Editorial, Ballot Box Blunder, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2001, at 22
[hereinafter Ballot Box Blunder].
154
H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000); ALLARD & MAUER, supra
note 4, at 5.
155
H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000).
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In New Mexico, a bill passed in 2001 repealed the state’s
lifetime ban on ex-felon voting.156 The bill eliminated the obstacle
of obtaining a pardon in order to vote.157 Instead, voting rights
are automatically restored once the ex-felon “has satisfactorily
completed the terms of a suspended or deferred sentence,” or is
“unconditionally discharged.”158 Supporters focused on the ban’s
impact on the lower economic classes.159
States such as Maryland, Virginia and Florida have also
established special committees and task forces in order to address
the problem of disenfranchisement.160 In Maryland, the state
legislature passed a bill in May 2001 creating a task force to
determine what modifications should be made to the state’s
current statute, which permanently disenfranchises all exfelons.161 The measure was enacted after a similar bill passed by
the House was unsuccessful in the Senate.162 The task force
released a report on its findings in January 2002.163 This report
156

S.B. 204, 2001 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
S.B. 204 § 2.
158
S.B. 204 § 2(A)(1)-(3); Rapoport, supra note 149. Ex-felons must
obtain a certificate of discharge from the state Parole Board that demonstrates
that they have met all of the terms of their sentence. S.U. Mahesh & David
Miles, N.M. Legal Clashes Loom As Hidden-Gun Law Starts, ALBUQUERQUE
J., July 1, 2001, at A1. This bill affects the voting status of 7,000 in New
Mexico. Id.
159
S.U. Mahesh, 2 Options Would Let Some Ex-felons Vote,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 2, 2001, at A10. Senate President Pro Tem Richard
Romero and Senator Manny Aragon, chairman of the Senate Rules Committee
were the major forces behind the bill’s passage. Id.
160
See H.R. 495, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001); Green, supra note
16; Holly A. Heyser, Crime Panel to Study Voting Rights of Ex-felons,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 19, 2001, at B1; Hiaasen, supra note 16, at 7B.
161
H.R. 495, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). The act created a
“Task Force to Study Repealing the Disenfranchisement of Convicted Exfelons in Maryland.” Id.; Rapoport, supra note 149.
162
Matthew Mosk & Lori Montgomery, House Backs Restoring
Criminals’ Voting Rights; Similar Measure Struck Down by Md. Senate,
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at B8.
163
TASK FORCE TO STUDY REPEALING THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF
CONVICTED FELONS IN MARYLAND, TASK FORCE REPORT (2002); Maryland:
Progress on Ex-Felon Voting Rights, DEMOCRACY DISPATCHES (Demos: A
157
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led to the creation of H.B.535, which the Assembly passed in the
spring of 2002.164 The bill permits ex-felons to vote after they
have completed “the court-ordered sentence.”165 The enactment
of this bill demonstrates the significant influence task forces such
as the one in Maryland can have on changing disenfranchisement
laws.
In Virginia, the State Crime Commission formed a task force
to address the process of restoring voting rights to ex-felons.166
Currently ex-felons must meet several requirements and
ultimately gain a pardon from the governor.167 In June 2002, task
force members announced their intention to amend the state
constitution in order to implement an easier voting restoration
process for ex-felons.168 The Commission’s proposal would
create an alternate track established and monitored by the
legislature, which would operate alongside the Governor’s
independent power to restore voting rights.169 Virginia’s current
governor, Mark R. Warner, is also developing his own proposal
to make voting restoration more efficient.170 Once the change
Network for Ideas and Action, New York, N.Y), Feb. 15, 2002, available at
http://www.demos-usa.org/Democracy_Reform/Dispatches16/. The task force
found that about 135,700 citizens are denied the right to vote. Id.; see also
Elaine Shen, Maryland’s Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons May be Easing,
BALT. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2002, available at http://baltimorechronicle.com/
disenfranchisement_feb02.html.
164
H.B. 535, 2002 Leg. 416th Sess. (Md. 2002).
165
Id. The bill took effect on January 1, 2003. Id. Before this law was
enacted, ex-felons could not qualify to vote until after the probation period had
ended. Id.
166
Green, supra note 16. The idea to form the task force was inspired by
a 1996 study by the Richmond Times-Dispatch that revealed that almost
270,000 felons had lost the right to vote in Virginia, as well as the national
study completed by the Sentencing Project in 1998. Id.; see also FELLNER &
MAUER, supra note 4, at 2; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2.
167
Green, supra note 16.
168
Christina Nuckols, State May Simplify Voting Rights Law, VIRGINIANPILOT, June 19, 2002, at B3. This additional process would most likely apply
to non-violent offenders. Mary Shaffrey, Voting Rights Eyed for Ex-felons,
WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at B01.
169
Green, supra note 16; Shaffrey, supra note 168.
170
Green, supra note 16; see also Nuckols, supra note 168.
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passes in the General Assembly, it would be voted upon in a
statewide referendum.171 Kenneth W. Stolle, Chairman of the
Virginia State Crime Commission and a Republican state senator,
initiated the creation of the task force.172 His participation in the
task force is an illustration of the increased viability of
disenfranchisement as a political issue. In the past, Stolle has
stalled the passage of voting rights statutes that attempted to ease
restrictions on ex-felons.173
In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush and his cabinet passed rules
that eased restrictions on ex-felons’ voting rights as of June
2001.174 Ex-felons who are nonviolent and not classified as
habitual offenders will be able to get their voting rights restored
without a hearing by the Executive Board of Clemency.175 The
new rules also reduce required paperwork and permit ex-felons
who have not paid all of their court fees to vote.176 Additionally,
the Florida Office of Executive Clemency recently shortened and
171

Shaffrey, supra note 168. Before the state’s constitution can be
amended, however, the final plan must first be successful in separate
referendums in two different legislative sessions. Id. at 180. In July 2000,
Virginia’s restoration process was modified to permit ex-felons to petition
circuit court judges in order to speed up the process. Roger Chesley, Efforts to
Restore Voting Rights to Ex-felons Grind Along, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 17,
2001, at B9. Since its inception, this measure has resulted in judicial approval
of 27 requests, of which all but one were granted by the Governor. Id.
172
See Heyser, supra note 160, at B1.
173
Id.
174
Florida Rules of Executive Clemency [hereinafter Florida Rules],
available at http://www.state.fl.us/fpc/RULES-6-14-01.pdf; see also Julie
Hauserman, supra note 16, at 4B. The changes were made after a bill in the
House that would automatically restore voting rights to ex-felons failed to
garner support throughout the state legislature. Mary Ellen Klas, House Panel:
Ex-Inmates Should Have Right to Vote, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 22, 2001, at
11A; see also Editorial, Constructive Clemency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June
17, 2001, at 2D.
175
Florida Rules, supra note 174. Under the old rules, felons who had
completed their sentences but still owed court fees and those who had been
convicted of more than two felonies would be required to appear before a
hearing of the Clemency Board. Maya Bell & Mark Silva, Felons Can Regain
Rights More Easily, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 2001, at A1.
176
Hauserman, supra note 16, at 4B.
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simplified the form used by ex-felons to apply for restoration.177
Before the form was changed, ex-felons were required to obtain
certified copies of court records and notify the presiding or chief
judge and prosecuting attorney of the application.178
All of these state-initiated efforts reflect a changing societal
view of criminal justice issues.179 The failure of harsh criminal
punishments to adequately improve crime statistics as well as the
prevalence of the disproportionate racial impact of such programs
are factors that influence the way lawmakers view
disenfranchisement.180 Disenfranchisement’s political viability is
also enhanced by the participation of individuals who are
affiliated with parties traditionally opposed to the relaxation of
criminal justice standards.181 Given the current activity in state
governments, therefore, the primary focus of felon
disenfranchisement activists should be on developing legislation
and courting political leaders who would be willing to alter such
laws at the state level. This approach has the advantage of

177

Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds
Changes to Aid Restoration of Voting Rights in Florida, Urges Governor to
Make Process Automatic (Apr. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release],
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n042402c.html. The state has
reduced the size of the questionnaire used by felons to apply for the restoration
of their voting rights from twelve pages to four. Bell & Silva, supra note 175,
at A1.
178
Press Release, supra note 177.
179
Rapoport, supra note 149.
180
Id. These factors have helped ex-felony disenfranchisement opponents
gain bi-partisan support on the local government level. Id.
181
Id. Connecticut Governor John Rowland and Virginia Chairman
Kenneth Stolle are examples. Id.; see also Heyser, supra note 160. With
support from politicians who traditionally have not been in favor of
disenfranchisement efforts, there is a greater likelihood that cooperation will
increase and modifications of disenfranchisement laws will be introduced more
frequently and passed more rapidly. See Rapoport, supra note 149; see also
Heyser, supra note 160. Furthermore, the presence of such politicians in the
process helps to legitimize the movement by demonstrating that
disenfranchisement is an issue that must and can be addressed on a broad
scale. See id. (discussing Chairman Stolle’s reasons for being involved in the
task force).
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achieving results quickly and effectively.182 Moreover, it provides
a direct way to change the laws instead of initiating a court
proceeding that is lengthy and subject to appeals.
CONCLUSION
Efforts to change outdated felony disenfranchisement laws
have had varying degrees of success.183 The court system has
traditionally been the main focus in disenfranchisement activism,
and many ex-felons have utilized different theories in order to
attack the laws.184 In federal court, lawsuits have used
constitutional arguments, centering on the Equal Protection
clause as well as the 1965 Voting Rights Act.185 While these
efforts provided initial promise, successes are few.186 In state
courts, litigation has focused not only on federal constitutional
provisions and laws, but also on the application of state statutes
and constitutional provisions.187 While such lawsuits have more
promise because of greater potential for flexibility in state laws,
disenfranchisement laws have yet to be significantly changed
182

See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4. Shapiro believes that “[t]ruly
effective legislative reform must occur at the state level.” Id.
183
See supra Part I (discussing disenfranchisement litigation); Part II
(discussing legislative approaches).
184
See supra Part I (analyzing the use of the Equal Protection Clause, the
Voting Rights Act and state law theories in disenfranchisement lawsuits).
185
See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225-28 (1985).
186
Id. Those that do succeed are limited to cases where both the intent to
discriminate and the impact of discrimination on a suspect class are obvious
and egregious. Id.; see also supra Part I.B (explaining the implications of the
decisions in Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986), and Baker v.
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996), in which litigants focused on Voting
Rights Act claims). While the Act was specifically enacted to target voting
qualifications that limit the rights of protected classes, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the Act as requiring evidence of discriminatory intent in order to
declare a state action invalid. See Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). Despite
Congress’ efforts to lessen that burden, federal courts consistently continue to
apply the standard. See supra Part I.B (discussing cases in which the federal
courts have declined to utilize the higher intent standard).
187
See supra Part I.C (analyzing the approaches taken in state court
litigation).
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using this method.188
In recent years, proposed legislation addressing the problem
of felony disenfranchisement has increased on both the federal
and state levels. The most significant federal bill, the Civic
Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, would guarantee all
ex-felons the right to vote in federal elections.189 Because the bill
was not enacted, however, its actual impact was minimal.190
Efforts to attack disenfranchisement laws should be
concentrated on the state and local legislatures. Bills and
constitutional amendments in state legislatures have been
frequently proposed and enacted throughout the country in recent
years.191 These types of changes have had the most significant
188

See supra Part I.C (outlining the possible state court options in felony
disenfranchisement lawsuits). While this approach has not yet been fully
explored, litigants in state court have the option of using both federal
constitutional rationales as well as any provided by the state’s own
constitution, which may provide more constitutional leeway than the federal
Constitution does. Id.
189
H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill represents a significant
achievement because it furthers political discussion of felony
disenfranchisement in Congress. See supra note 144 (listing prominent
legislators involved in the creation of H.R. 906). Because felony
disenfranchisement has typically not attracted nationally known politicians to
champion the issue, the fact that legislation was introduced and considered in a
U.S. House committee demonstrates that the political atmosphere may be
shifting, if only slightly, to create a more favorable environment to raise such
issues. Id.
190
Hearing, supra note 132. The bill died in the Judiciary committee after
the October 21, 1999 hearing. Id.; see also ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4,
at 12; Miller, supra note 146.
191
See supra Part II.B (giving examples of states in which constitutional
amendments and bills have been debated and/or passed). Local legislators have
been influential in amending state constitutions to ease voting restrictions on
both felons and ex-felons. See, e.g., H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del.
2000) (amending the Delaware constitution to permit persons convicted of
certain felonies excluding murder, manslaughter, offenses against public
administration including bribery, and sexual offenses to vote after being
pardoned or five years after the completion of their sentences). Legislators
have also created task forces to streamline the pardon process. See, e.g.,
Green, supra note 16 (describing the task force set up by the Virginia State
Crime Commission to address the restoration of voting rights for ex-felons).
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and influential impact on improving access to the ballot box, and
the changes have occurred throughout the country, including in
several Southern states.192 Such modifications have the most
potential to reinstate voting rights to the greatest number of
people.193 Therefore, in states that continue to enforce restrictive
disenfranchisement laws, the best avenue to combat these laws
lies in the local legislature.

Finally, they have restored the right to vote to thousands in the felony
population. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8. In Delaware, twenty
percent of black men were permanently disenfranchised under the old felony
disenfranchisement statute. Id. Connecticut disenfranchised over 42,000 exfelons under the previous statute. Id. at 9. In New Mexico, four percent, or
almost 50,000 ex-felons were disenfranchised before the passage of the 2001
bill. Id. See supra Part II.B (outlining additional material regarding the new
legislation in these states).
192
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 4. For example, efforts were
taken in 1999 in Alabama’s House to pass legislation requiring that the Board
of Pardons and Parole automatically restore voting rights upon completion of a
felon’s sentence. Id.; see supra Part II.B (providing information regarding the
efforts underway in Florida and Virginia).
193
See ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2 (noting enhanced voting
activity in seven states). The range and scope of actions being taken
throughout the country to change disenfranchisement laws is illustrative of the
potential significant impact state legislation can have on this issue. Id.
Furthermore, the political climate in the states has become more favorable to
changes, which makes lobbying local legislators the most productive avenue.
See supra Part II.B (illustrating that politicians in several states are working
together in a bi-partisan effort to modify the existing disenfranchisement
laws).

